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ABSTRACT
Analyzing cryptocurrency payment flows has become a key forensic method in law enforcement
and is nowadays used to investigate a wide spectrum of criminal activities. However, despite its
widespread adoption, the evidential value of obtained findings in court is still largely unclear. In
this paper, we focus on the key ingredients of modern cryptocurrency analytic techniques, which
are clustering heuristics and attribution tags. By empirically quantifying the effect of CoinJoin
transactions, we illustrate that clustering heuristics can lead to false interpretations. We then
discuss clustering heuristics and attribution tags in the light of internationally accepted legal
standards and rules for substantiating suspicions and providing evidence in court. From that we
derive a set of legal key requirements and translate them into a data sharing framework that builds
on existing legal and technical standards. Integrating that framework in modern cryptocurrency
analytics tools could allow more efficient and effective investigations, while safeguarding their
evidential value.
1. Introduction
Tracking and tracing payment-flows in cryptocurrencies by analyzing transactions in the underlying, publicly-
available blockchain, has become a key forensic method in law enforcement. It is used to investigate a wide spectrum
of criminal activities relying on the pseudo-anonymous nature of cryptocurrencies, ranging from the purchase of il-
licit goods and services on Darknet markets (Soska and Christin, 2015), over ransomware attacks (Huang, McCoy,
Aliapoulios, Li, Invernizzi, Bursztein, McRoberts, Levin, Levchenko and Snoeren, 2018; Paquet-Clouston, Haslhofer
and Dupont, 2018), to extortion and money laundering (FATF, 2015). A typical forensic investigation starts from one
or more suspect addresses and traces monetary flows up to some known exit point, which is typically an exchange or
a wallet provider service, where cryptocurrencies are converted back into fiat currencies.
Cryptocurrency investigations are nowadays supported by a number of commercial (e.g. Chainalysis, Elliptic, etc.)
and non-commercial analysis tools (e.g. BlockSci; Kalodner, Goldfeder, Chator, Möser and Narayanan (2017), Graph-
Sense; Haslhofer, Karl and Filtz (2016)) that exploit the openness of the cryptocurrency transaction ledger also known
as blockchain. They build on a long history of research that has shown that pseudonymous addresses do not pro-
vide sufficient anonymity, neither in Bitcoin (Meiklejohn, Pomarole, Jordan, Levchenko, McCoy, Voelker and Savage,
2013; Androulaki, Karame, Roeschlin, Scherer and Capkun, 2013; Möser, 2013; Monaco, 2015) nor in post-Bitcoin
currencies, with stronger privacy-enhancing techniques, such as ZCash (Quesnelle, 2018; Kappos, Yousaf, Maller and
Meiklejohn, 2018) or Monero (Miller, Möser, Lee and Narayanan, 2017; Kumar, Fischer, Tople and Saxena, 2017),
which has shown to be traceable until early 2017.
Investigation tools mainly rely on two complementary techniques: Address clustering heuristics or clustering
heuristics for short, which are used to group multiple addresses into maximal subsets (clusters) that can be likely
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assigned to the same real-world actor, and attribution tags, which are any form of context information that can be
attributed to an address, transaction or cluster, such as the name of an exchange hosting the associated wallet or some
other personally identifiable information (PII) of the account holder. The strength lies in the combination of these tech-
niques: a tag attributed to a single address belonging to a larger cluster can easily de-anonymize hundreds of thousands
cryptocurrency addresses (c.f. Kumar et al. (2017)).
However, despite the promising benefits of before mentioned cryptocurrency analytics techniques in criminal in-
vestigations, the evidential value of those techniques as well as implications for digital forensics remain largely unclear:
first, certain types of transactions (e.g. CoinJoin Möser and Böhme (2016)) could distort clustering results, unify en-
tities that have no association in the real-world and can lead to the formation of so called super-clusters (Harrigan and
Fretter, 2016). Second, false, unreliable, or intentionally misplaced attribution tags could associate unrelated actors
with a given cluster and lead to suspicions against innocent people or even to false convictions.
Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) increasingly recognize the value of “information sharing to maximize investiga-
tive resources and avoid duplicate efforts” (Interpol, 2018). This also applies to sharing attribution tags and address
clusters in cryptocurrency forensics. Both detection methods become more effective by sharing obtained information.
In that regard, the lack of a standardized ontology and analytical approaches additionally amplifies the aforementioned
risks of forensic cryptocurrency analysis in particular if attribution tags are shared in a framework that does not safe-
guard the evidential value of the shared content (Casey, Back and Barnum, 2015; Garfinkel, 2010).
In this paper, we propose measures for safeguarding the evidential value of forensic cryptocurrency investigation
results. After introducing the necessary background in Section 2, we make a number of contributions that can be
summarized as follows:
• We empirically quantify the effects of CoinJoin transactions on cluster formation and dispersion in Section 3.
• We systematically investigate internationally accepted legal standards and rules for providing court-proof evi-
dence and derive key requirements for forensic cryptocurrency investigations in Section 4.
• Finally, we translate those requirements into a data sharing framework for law enforcement agencies that provides
safeguards to maintain the evidential value of forensic cryptocurrency investigations by ensuring compliance
with existing regulations in Section 5.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to tackle cryptocurrency forensics and analytics from a combined
legal and technical perspective. We believe that it can therefore simultaneously serve as a blueprint for law enforcement
investigators, prosecutors, or cryptocurrency analytics tool providers who aim to comply with existing regulations.
2. Background and Related Work
In this section, we briefly introduce central notions and concepts used throughout this paper. While we do not
attempt to give a complete introduction to the underlying technology of cryptocurrencies, we direct the reader to exist-
ing literature, such as Nakamoto (2008); Bonneau, Miller, Clark, Narayanan, Kroll and Felten (2015); Tschorsch and
Scheuermann (2016); Judmayer, Stifter, Krombholz and Weippl (2017). In the following, we use Bitcoin as a running
example but most findings can be easily translated to any UTXO (Unspent Transaction Output) based cryptocurrency.
2.1. Address Clustering Heuristics
There are several address clustering heuristic in use today, the safest, most effective and most studied one being the
multi-input heuristic (Meiklejohn et al., 2013; Nick, 2015). Its underlying intuition, which is illustrated in Figure 1a,
is that if two addresses (i.e. A and B) are used as inputs in the same transaction while one of these addresses along
with another address (i.e. B and C) are used as inputs in another transaction, then the three addresses (A, B and C)
must somehow be controlled by the same actor, who conducted both transactions and therefore possesses the private
keys corresponding to all three addresses.
The underlying assumption of the multiple-input heuristics holds for most Bitcoin transactions although there
are known obfuscation mechanisms that can violate this assumption: for example, transactions that are generated
by a mixing scheme called CoinJoin (Möser and Böhme, 2016) where 푛 parties produce a special joint transaction.
Figure 1b sketches the structure of a CoinJoin transaction. This scheme is used to conceal the relationships between
inputs and outputs and in the end who of the 푛 parties transacted with whom. For multi-input address clustering this
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a Multi-Input Clustering Heuristics: Addresses 퐴 and 퐵 are
inputs of transaction 푇1 and must therefore be controlled by theowner of the corresponding private keys. The same holds for ad-
dresses 퐵 and 퐶 of 푇2. Since address 퐵 occurs in the set of inputsof 푇1 and 푇2 one can infer that addresses 퐴, 퐵, 퐶 , and 퐷 are con-trolled by the same actor.
TCoinJoin
Bob: 5
Alice: 10
Change: 2
Carol: 3
Dave: 3
Change: 7
b CoinJoin Transaction (based on Möser and Böhme (2016)):
several individual payments from multiple parties are combined
into a single transaction.
Internet Archive
1Archive1n2C579dMsAu3
iC6tWzuQJz8dN
Figure 2: Attribution Tag: an attribution tag attributes contextual information to a cryptocurrency address.
transactions schemes pose a problem because the clustering algorithm would combine all 푛 input addresses and their
respective clusters into one entity. Meaning we merged 푛 potentially independent parties into one.
All clustering heuristics have in common that they rely on certain behavioral patterns to group addresses that likely
belong to the same owner. Although different clustering heuristics depend on different behavioral assumptions1, they
all suffer from similar problems.
To systematically evaluate the effectiveness of those heuristics, ground truth data2 is needed, but not available
and generally hard to obtain (Nick, 2015). Furthermore, the reliability of the heuristics to some extend depend on
user behavior which can change and leaves room for obfuscation (nopara73, 2017). We only consider the multi-input
heuristic in the following. But out of given reasons many of the results and problems also apply to other clustering
heuristics. For a taxonomy of different clustering heuristics we refer to (Meiklejohn et al., 2013; Androulaki et al.,
2013).
A number of studies attempted to quantify the effectiveness of clustering techniques: (Nick, 2015) measured the
accuracy of different clustering algorithms using a ground-truth dataset consisting of 37,585 user wallets, which was
obtained via a vulnerability in the BitcoinJ light client implementation. The results showed that on average 69.34% of
the addresses could be linked using only the multi-input heuristics. Harrigan and Fretter (2016) studied reasons for the
effectiveness of multi-input address clustering and came to the conclusion that address reuse and avoidable merging
are the main drivers. They also measured the growth patterns of clusters and found that merges of two large clusters
are rare in general and could be an indicator of wrongfully merged clusters.
The reliability of clustering results is of uttermost importance for forensic investigations. Wrong clustering results
can lead to missed- or even false convictions.
2.2. Attribution Tags
Tagging is a collaborative process in which a user adds (mostly textual) labels or tags to shared content. It does
not rely on static, predefined taxonomic structures but on dynamic, community-driven linguistic terms and concep-
tions (Golder and Huberman, 2006). Tagging became popular with the launch of sites like Delicious and Flickr around
2005 and is now a standard feature that can be found in many social media sites. When applied in the context of
cryptocurrencies, as shown in Figure 2, a tag could for example attribute a given Bitcoin address to some real-world
actor (e.g. Internet Archive).
1For example: Private keys are not shared, thus nobody can create transactions with inputs not belonging to her (multi-input); Or nobody would
include unnecessary inputs, thus we can infer change outputs (optimal change).
2Disjoint sets of addresses known to belong together (clusters).
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Despite their wide-spread adoption, tagging systems still face a number of problems: a tag can be ambiguous and
have many related meanings (polysemy), multiple tags can have the same meaning (synonymy), or the semantics of
a tag might range from very specific to very general because people describe resources along a continuum of speci-
ficity (Golder and Huberman, 2006). If, in the context of cryptocurrencies, a user attributes an address with the tag
“ransomware” it is not entirely clear whether this tag means that the tagged address belongs to a victim or the originator
of a cybercrime attack or that the tag is just somehow related to this topic (c.f. Article 6 EU-LED). Further contextual
information, such as a more detailed description, can only be determined after reconciling label-based tags with their
authors.
Semantic ambiguity of tags can also be exploited to find irregularities in address clustering: Ermilov et al. Ermilov,
Panov and Yanovich (2017) devised a new clustering algorithm that uses tagging data as additional clustering criteria.
They categorize tags on addresses and create so called negative pairs, if such a negative or conflicting pair would be
introduced in a cluster in course of merging two clusters, cluster formation is aborted (e.g. a cluster is unlikely to be
an exchange and a gambling service at the same time).
As for clustering the reliability of tag data is crucial for investigations. The reliability of tags mainly depends on
the origin of the tag as well as its processing history (c.f. 4.3)
2.3. Provenance and Digital Evidence
In large scale data sharing efforts, data is continuously added, modified, or deleted by users having different back-
grounds, technical skill, and intentions. Data integrated from several sources into another, possibly diverging context
is therefore never fully clean, certain, and only as trustworthy as its source. In order to assess the quality, uncertainty,
and authority of data, users must therefore know the sources and applied data generation and processing routines.
Provenance refers to sources of information that describe the entities and processes involved in producing, deliv-
ering, or otherwise influencing a data artifact. It provides a critical foundation for assessing quality and authenticity,
as well as enabling trust and allowing reproducibility. Provenance is crucial in deciding whether information is to be
trusted, how it should be integrated with other diverse information sources and how to credit originators when reusing
it (Gil, Cheney, Groth, Hartig, Miles, Moreau, Da Silva, Coppens, Garijo, Gomez, Missier, Myers, Sahoo and Zhao,
2010).
The importance of provenance has been recognized in a number of application areas: in the field of databases and
data warehousing, provenance information represents the lineage of data, which is a historical record of the data and
its origins. It can be used for tracing root causes of errors in data analytics processes, data-dependency analysis, as
well as auditing or compliance analysis (c.f. Cui and Widom (2003); Karvounarakis (2009)). Data provenance is also
discussed in the field of scientific data sharing and processing to support data protection, data ethics (Hadziselimovic,
Fatema, Pandit and Lewis, 2017) and tracking the lineage (origin and subsequent processing history) of scientific data
sets (Bose and Frew, 2005). For a more general overview on provenance management for computational tasks in
various domains we refer to the survey by Freire et al. (Freire, Silva, Koop and Santos, 2008).
In forensic investigations, provenance information is recorded in order to provide sufficient information to evalu-
ate the authenticity, integrity and reliability of evidence and thus if it can be used in court. Traditionally provenance
information was mainly based on filling paper- or electronic-forms with the name of the investigators, a description of
the evidence under examination and some kind of hash code (Giova, 2011). Modern forensic software can automate
much of the manual work needed to produce so called audit trails and provide stronger guarantees by using existing
digital infrastructure and techniques such as user management, digital signatures, or even blockchains (Stoffers, 2017)
for creating provenance information. Over the last two decades a number of studies investigated forensic procedures
and process models. A review by Pollitt has shown that there is no consistent, generic model applicable to criminal
investigations (Pollitt, 2007). More recent research by Cosic and Miroslav (Cosic and Baca, 2010) proposes a con-
ceptual digital evidence management framework (DEMF) to improve the chain of custody of digital evidence in all
investigation phases. They suggest using hash codes for fingerprinting of evidence (what), hash similarity to con-
trol changes (how), biometric identification and authentication for digital signing (who), automatic and trusted time
stamping (when), as well as GPS and RFID for geo-location (where). These measures can be implemented through a
database which records activities done by first responders, forensic investigators, court expert witness, law enforcement
personnel, and police officers.
Reliable provenance tracking of digital evidence (e.g. clustering data, attribution tags) is of high importance in
digital forensics and cryptocurrency investigations. Especially the source of data and the analysis methods applied to
data are relevant to determine the reliability of evidence provided in court.
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Figure 3: #Addresses found in the 100 largest Bitcoin clusters (naïve multi-input heuristic) until April 30th, 2018.
Compared to #Addresses in the cluster potentially involved in a CoinJoin transaction, note the log scale. a) Full b)
Structural
3. Empirical Analysis
After having introduced the multi-input clustering heuristic, attribution tags as well as provenance tracking as
the key ingredients to cryptocurrency investigations, we now move on and empirically analyze how often CoinJoin
transactions unify entities that are unlikely to have an association in the real-world, hence lead to potentially wrong
clustering results. This gives insight into how prevalent CoinJoins are in real world as well as a heuristic approximation
of the strength of a cluster, which is useful since large scale ground truth data for the evaluation of the actual strength
of multi-input clustering heuristics is not available and hard to obtain.
3.1. Coinjoins and the Multi-Input Clustering Heuristic
CoinJoin transactions pose a problem to naïve3 multi-input address clustering, since they violate the base assump-
tion that all inputs of the transaction are controlled by the same entity.
Goldfeder, Kalodner, Reisman and Narayanan (2018) developed and evaluated a heuristic to identify potential
CoinJoin transactions. They find the heuristic to be reliable and claim that at current state of research there is no
known way to create a CoinJoin transaction without the indicators that would lead to a detection by the heuristic. A
limitation of the heuristic in their full version is that it is slow for transactions with a large number of inputs, this is
unavoidable since the underlying problem to solve is NP-complete. This also means the full version of the heuristic
is often not feasible for transactions with a large number of inputs, this leaves room for missed classifications or false
negatives. False positives are possible but unlikely according to the authors.
3.2. Empirical Method and Findings
In the following we use CoinJoin detection heuristics to quantify how many of the addresses in a given cluster were
used as input in a CoinJoin transaction detected by the heuristics.
We use BlockSci (Kalodner et al., 2017) to get a list of potential CoinJoin transactions. BlockSci implements the
full heuristic as described in Goldfeder et al. (2018) as well as a faster structural approach, that avoids much of the
computational effort in exchange for a potentially higher false positive rate. We used both versions of the heuristic and
looked at all Bitcoin transactions from its inception until April 30th, 2018.
We found 1 731 551 unique transactions that are classified as CoinJoins involving 12 322 902 input addresses. We
extracted the addresses of all inputs used in such a transaction and joined them with the clustering results. Our cluster-
dataset cointains 40 049 947 clusters created using the naïve multi-input address clustering algorithm as described
in Meiklejohn et al. (2013). We end up with how many addresses in a particular cluster were involved in a potential
CoinJoin. The ratio between addresses in the cluster and addresses likely involved in a CoinJoin gives a rough indication
of the trustworthiness or reliability of the cluster.
3With naïve we mean multi-input clustering that does not have special handling for CoinJoins e.g. remove potential CoinJoin before clustering.
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Figure 3 shows the 100 largest clusters found in Bitcoin produced by the multi-input address clustering heuristic.
In the whole dataset 723 247 of the clusters or around 2% contain at least one CoinJoin with a mean of around 17
addresses involved, produced by roughly 2.4 CoinJoin transactions.
This result shows that naïve multi-input address clustering is significantly biased by CoinJoin transactions, espe-
cially if we look at larger clusters. Clustering for law enforcement purposes should always consider CoinJoins as a
special case employing heuristics described in Goldfeder et al. (2018), either to proactively exclude potential CoinJoin
transactions from clustering or by at least marking clusters that contain CoinJoins for manual human intervention.
Obviously, looking at the multi-input heuristic alone does not give a complete picture, other clustering heuristics
such as the change heuristic Meiklejohn et al. (2013) also suffer from false positives. In general we can say: Cluster-
ing heuristics are rules of thumb, that rely on assumptions that were reasonable at the time they were created.These
assumptions need to be reevaluated to see if they still hold, especially if the assumptions are based on user behaviour
nopara73 (2017). This raises the need to observe relevant behavioural changes to be able to reevaluate in time. In the
end, to thoroughly evaluate the reliability of clustering heuristics, ground truth data is needed. The evaluation needs
to be reiterated whenever relevant behavior changes.
4. The Legal Perspective
Besides technical issues, the usage of address clustering and attribution tags for law enforcement purposes raises
numerous yet unresolved legal questions that we address in this section. Questions mainly arise from the law of
substantiation of evidence and suspicion and fall into two sub-categories:
First, the main goal of any law enforcement agency that uses cryptocurrency forensic tools is to create relevant,
court-proof evidence or at least reasonable suspicion as a basis for further investigations. Evidence is relevant if it
makes the matter that requires proof more or less probable (c.f. UK v. Kilbourne, 1973, AC 729). Therefore, the data
used in a criminal trial or as a basis for substantiation of a suspicion must be admissible and carry a high evidential
value (Casey, 2011, Chapter 3). The admissibility of evidence requires at least that the gathering, processing and
usage of the evidence was/is lawful under the respective domestic and/or international criminal procedural and data
protection law (Heinson, 2015; Mohay, Anderson, Collie, McKemmish and Vel, 2003). The evidential value of data
is determined through the contained information and the quality of the analytical methods to process the data, as well
as the authenticity and integrity of both (Casey, 2011, Chapter 3).
To date, there are no internationally valid rules for the treatment of digital evidence and the legal rules for substan-
tiating suspicions and providing evidence in court vary greatly from one country to another. Nevertheless, a number
of general rules can be developed which should meet the evidence standards of most countries. The minimum stan-
dards proposed below were obtained from a summary of the following sources: a) written law for evidence in criminal
procedures (e.g. US-FRE; GER-CCP; NL-CCP), b) case law of several supreme courts of several countries (e.g. USA
and Germany) (Eschelbach, 2018; Miebach, 2016, overview over German surpreme court decisions:) (Frye v. US;
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 1993; Lorraine v. Markel, 2007), c) recommendations of international
groups of forensic experts (e.g. the SWGDE) , and d) scientific publications on the evidential value of IT forensic
investigations (Casey, 2011; Heinson, 2015; Mohay et al., 2003; Maras, 2015; Casey, Barnum, Griffith, Snyder, van
Beek and Nelson, 2017).
Second, most legal systems give the accused a right to inspect the records or oblige the public prosecutor’s office
to disclose their evidence as a part of their right to a fair trial. Hence, the documentation of the process of clustering
and tagging must meet the requirements of criminal trial record keeping. In addition, with a general increase of
information exchange between LEAs the sharing of clustering data and attribution tags poses new questions in the area
of data protection which are also addressed in this section.
4.1. Lawfulness of Data Processing
Data processing must be in compliance with the legal framework it takes place in (Casey, 2011, pp. 56 et sqq.).
For criminal investigations the respective criminal procedural law and data protection law constitute the rules for the
processing and in particular require a sufficient legal basis and compliance with data protection principles. The required
quality of the legal basis depends on the respective level of protection as well as the extent/scope of the processing.
Clustering and attribution techniques are specifically used to identify natural persons (i.e. suspects). The used data
consequently relates to identifiable natural persons and is hence deemed personal data (c.f. EU-GDPR; EU-LED; US-
CCPA) that is protected on international (e.g. CFR; ECHR; EU-GDPR; EU-LED) and national (e.g. IN-PDPB, 2018;
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UK-DPA, 2018; GER-BDSG, 2018; US-FISMA, 2014) level as well as in subject specific laws and regulations (e.g.
NIST-800-171; US-GLBA, 1999). As the scope of protection differs, the data protection principles in this paper are
derived from the European data protection framework, namely the General Data Protection Regulation (EU-GDPR)
and the so called Law Enforcement Directive (EU-LED). Although the GDPR is not directly applicable in the area of
law enforcement (EU-GDPR, Article 2 (2) lit. d), the general concepts are transferable and reappear in the LED as
well as in national legislation. In addition, where forensic analyses are outsourced and conducted by (private) third
parties (e.g. van Baar, van Beek and van Eijk (2014)), the GDPR remains applicable. The European approach arguably
acts as a role model internationally (c.f. IN-PDPB, 2018; US-CCPA; Albrecht, 2016) and also contains relatively high
standards which help to fulfill the evidence requirements described in Sections 4.2 to 4.6.
Processing can be roughly split into (1) the collection of data and (2) the subsequent processing. Transaction data
is gathered from a publicly available blockchain, while attribution data can derive from public and non-public sources.
Legal implications of processing publicly available data for law enforcement purposes are still subject to ongoing
discussion, however, both steps can arguably be based on general clauses to a certain extent. In addition, data obtained
through existing law enforcement communication channels such as SIENA, the Schengen Information System (SIS)
or Interpol’s I24/7 and I-Link can usually be seen as lawful due to their legal frameworks and the safeguards included
in these systems (Interpol RPD, Art. 34, 37, 63), (Europol Regulation, Art. 17), (EU-SFD, 2016).
The processing (collection/analysis) of data should be limited to the extent necessary for the specific investigation
(purpose limitation). The data volume (data minimization) and retention dates (storage limitation) of data have to be
limited to what is necessary for the specific purpose and the data integrity has to be ensured. The principle of trans-
parency requires the investigator/prosecutor to explain the processing to a certain extent either to the data subject or the
data protection authorities (e.g. EU-LED, Recital 38). In practice, most legislations limit the transparency requirement
to ensure effective law enforcement (c.f. 4.7). While fully automated decision making is generally prohibited, decisions
such as ordering further investigative measures, can still be based on results of automated analytics techniques (e.g.
clustering of cryptocurrency addresses) if the decisions are not merely formalistic. That means that all relevant aspects
of the individual case carefully have to be taken into account (c.f. EU-LED, Art. 11, Recital 38, (Rich, 2016, "totality-
of-the-circumstances analysis")) by a natural person. In order to mitigate the risk of misinterpretation of probabilistic
results as facts and enable the decision-maker to assess its significance, the latter must be well-trained and the software
they use as clear and differentiated as possible (c.f. Section 4.4).
Moreover, the data has to be accurate (c.f. EU-LED, Art. 4 (1) lit. c; Europol Regulation, Art. 28 (1) lit. d;
Recommendation No.R (87) 15, 1987). Since only facts can be inaccurate, data protection law does not prohibit the
processing of data based on estimations (heuristics) or probabilistic measures. However, the principle of accuracy
requires the clear distinction of facts and probabilistic or estimated results such as address clusters (EU-LED, Art.
7; Europol Regulation, Art. 29; Recommendation No.R (87) 15, 1987). To assess the nature and reliability of the
data it is hence necessary to have sufficient meta-information (see 5.1 and 5.4) available. In addition, the used clus-
tering heuristics have to be reviewed steadily since changes in cryptocurrency network protocols or user behavior can
significantly limit the reliability of results or even render a heuristic obsolete.
The resulting risk of false positives raises the question how to deal with the finding that an address has been
erroneously attributed to a cluster or a tag contains erroneous information. Data protection law usually requires the
data controller to rectify, or in some cases, erase false data. c.f. (EU-LED, Art. 16 (3)). In both cases, measures to
avoid automatic reproduction of erroneous data have to be implemented (e.g. mark the address/cluster as erroneous;
exclude the address from clustering or tagging). If data has been shared, receivers of the false or outdated data must
be informed.
4.2. Authenticity and Integrity (Chain of Custody)
The authenticity and integrity of data correlates with the probative value of information in criminal proceedings
(Casey, 2011, p. 59 et sqq.) but is also a data protection requirement (e.g. Art. 29 EU-LED; c.f. 4.1). Authenticity must
be ensured in all forensic steps and procedures that involve the processing of electronically stored information (Lorraine
v. Markel, 2007; Colorado v. Huehn, 2002; US-FRE). This makes comprehensive and precise documentation of data
sources, tools, and applied techniques necessary (see Section 4.5). The preferable way of presentation is subject to
an ongoing discussion (e.g. Neumann, Kaye, Jackson, Reyna and Ranadive, 2016), however, the analysis procedure,
outcomes and limitations have to be explainable in a comprehensible manner that allows an assessment of the evidential
value in trials (Neumann et al. 2016; Sjerps and Berger 2012; Lund and Iyer 2017, p. 22) . It must be ensured that
data has not been altered, which can be achieved by technical means e.g. through the use of digital signatures. If data
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is changed, it must be clear how the alteration exactly changed the data.
Verifying authenticity of data requires that the original data/source is known and that all changes were tracked (Lor-
raine v. Markel, 2007, at 546). In this regard, it might be helpful to attach ’certainty-values’ to data as proposed by
Casey (2011, p. 70). Similarly, data protection law particularly requires the data processor to be able to demonstrate
compliance with data protection law to ensure accountability (c.f. EU-LED, Art. 4, 19, 25, Recital 57, WP29 - LED,
2017, p. 25; WP29 - Accountability, 2010; US-FISMA, 2014; NIST-800-53). The same requirements apply for data
from external sources. A simple strategy for proving authenticity and integrity of data is to guarantee reproducibility
of results by applying the same technique on the same data source. This means at least the name of the source, time
of access and liability of the source must be recorded as provenance information. Since availability of online data
often is not guaranteed, additional measures should be implemented to enable the user to prove authenticity of the data
(Heinson, 2015, p. 147) (e.g. by archiving content in the WARC File Format (ISO 28500); archive.org; (Kelly and
Weigle, 2012).
Cryptocurrency forensic tools that operate on-top of a specific cryptocurrency benefit from the underlying concepts
of blockchain technology which already provide strong authenticity and integrity guarantees (e.g. signed transactions)
and integrity proofs (proof of work, hash linked list). Outcomes of the analysis are hence easily reproducible, given the
currency code (e.g. BTC, ETH), the most recent block hash as well as the analysis method are recorded (as identifiers)
within the chain of custody, given the analysis method is deterministic.
Ensuring the authenticity and integrity of clustering results is more challenging: tools implementing such tech-
niques create new tool-specific data points that group known cryptocurrency addresses into a set of clusters, which
are usually identified by some tool-specific identifier. Since clustering algorithms run periodically over an evolving
transaction ledger, generated clusters are volatile meaning that a cluster generated at a certain cryptocurrency state is
not necessarily equal to a cluster generated at a later cryptocurrency state. In order to provide authenticity and integrity
of clustering results, tools must implement deterministic cluster identifiers that remain stable when a cluster refers to
the same set of addresses over several runs and change when the underlying set of addresses changes. This could be
achieved by computing a hash (cluster hash) over the lexically sorted set of addresses within each cluster and also
allow interoperability and comparability of clustering results across tools.
Attribution tag authenticity and integrity can be ensured by relating a tag to its source, its creator (e.g. using digital
signatures) and generation procedures.
4.3. Reliability
Reliability correlates with the weight of evidence in a criminal procedure (Neumann et al., 2016; Good, 1950)
and is hence of relevance for the (free) consideration of evidence in trials and in pre-trial stages to establish neces-
sary degrees of suspicion (e.g. US: ’reasonable suspicion’ (Terry v. Ohio, 1968), GER: ’sufficient factual indication’
(GER-CCP, § 152 (2)), UK: ’belief that a crime may have been committed’ (UK-CCP - Code of Practice, Section
2.1), NL: ’reasonable suspicion’ (NL-CCP, Section 27 § 1; Singelnstein, 2018). Consequently, digital/electronic evi-
dence should be based on precise and scientifically verified methods irrespective of whether the digital investigation
is conducted "in-house" or if it is outsourced (e.g. DFaaS: van Baar et al., 2014).
In addition, the methods must be applied properly when collecting and processing data (UK Code for Crown
Prosecutors; US-FRE). Reliability hence has to be evaluated for the scientific methods as well as the correct use of
them. A lack of scientific verifiability results in a reduced evidential value or, at worst, in the valuelessness of the
evidence. Proof can be brought forward by describing results of testing the process, the logic of the process, or by
having an expert testimony (US-FRE; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 1993; Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 1999) (Heinson, 2015). A combination of these approaches generally increases the reliability of evidence
in court and the unavailability of a specific approach increases the importance of the other. In the given context,
the reliability of information can be influenced on three levels: (i) the implementation of clustering heuristics, (ii)
annotations, and (iii) the correct use of the tools.
Clustering Reliability: Although proving the reliability of algorithms is subject to an ongoing discussion (Kehl,
Guo and Kessler, 2017), we can assume that a reliability assessment of clustering processes must consider the un-
derlying (usually formalized) heuristics, its implementation (algorithm), and its functioning when being applied on a
particular cryptocurrency (logic of the process)
Assessing the overall effectiveness of a formalized heuristic could be achieved by testing it against some collected
and verified ground truth (e.g. black-box testing). In the case of clustering heuristics, ground truth could be a set of
known and verified cryptocurrency wallets, each carrying a set of addresses belonging to the same real-world user.
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However, as discussed in Section 2, ground-truth wallet data is hard to obtain, often constructed ad-hoc, for scientific
purposes only. Creation of a general, authoritative standard ground-truth dataset would ease the quantification of
clustering effectiveness and provide specific reliability measures and probabilities, as in other forensic methods (e.g.
DNA testing). At EU level, the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD) stipulates the creation of a central user
database. In future, LEA databases may provide ground-truth data and allow better reliability evaluation of forensic
tools and could also be used to generate cyber-threat intelligence (CTI) (Ribaux and Wright, 2014, p. 498)
Furthermore, clustering algorithms usually rely on user behavior assumptions and the respective cryptocurrency
protocol. Both are subject to change, so the underlying assumption of a clustering algorithm may lose validity over
time. Assumptions and algorithms hence have to be reviewed and revised regularly. In addition, if the assumptions are
known, the user behavior can deliberately be changed to influence the analysis outcomes. For example, users could
create crafted CoinJoin transactions to mislead the multiple-input heuristic (see 2.1) or trick the change heuristic (Meik-
lejohn et al., 2013) into miss-classifying the change output, effectively merging clusters of senders and receivers. As
long as the effectiveness of clustering remains difficult to evaluate, the evidential value of clustering techniques is
limited and the description of the logic of the process (e.g. heuristics, user behavior, protocols) and expert testimonies
become more important for clustering techniques to maintain a certain evidential value.
Attribution Tag Reliability: The reliability of an annotation tag largely depends on its origin, its generation
procedure, and how it is processed and assigned to a certain address or cluster by a forensic tool. If, for instance, an
investigator identifies a cryptocurrency donation address on a known website and assigns a tag to that address (e.g.
“Internet Archive”) then we can consider this as being a highly reliable attribution tag. If a tag is extracted from a
dataset that has been crawled by an unknown entity and unknown technical procedures at an unknown point in time
and is then assigned to a large number of cryptocurrency addresses via a tool’s clustering algorithm, then we can
consider this tag as being on the other side of the reliability spectrum. Since it is hard to quantify attribution tag
reliability in a universal and interoperable manner, each attribution tag should provide details about its origin (source)
and its generation process (e.g. manual extraction vs. automated crawl).
Correct Use of Tools: To prove the correct use of tools the interaction with the software has to be logged exten-
sively. Logging also helps to explain investigation steps and should include information on the technical configuration
to help assessing the overall reliability. Extensive logging can also help proving compliance with other general evi-
dence rules and data protection rules (4.2 and 4.1). Where analysis results are shared between LEAs they should contain
information on the points stated above to allow an assessment of reliability of the information at all times (Europol
Regulation, 2016; Recommendation No.R (87) 15, 1987).
4.4. Qualification
Investigators and experts who use cryptocurrency analytics methods to obtain and analyze electronic and digital
evidence in criminal proceedings must be qualified to use those methods (Mohay et al., 2003; Heinson, 2015; Casey,
2011). Lack of qualification in dealing with IT forensic methods can have considerable influence on investigations and
the resulting evidence. On the one hand, the lack of qualification of the investigators involved lowers the evidential
value of the investigation results. On the other hand, the lack of or inadequate qualification of investigators and court-
appointed experts increases the probability that wrong conclusions will be drawn from the available evidence and,
in the worst case, that the public prosecutor’s office and/or the court will make their decisions on the basis of false
facts or assumptions (US National Research Council, 2009; Heinson, 2015). Unfortunately, there are no international
standards yet on what qualifications investigators and experts must have in handling electronic and digital evidence.
To ensure acceptable minimum standards, investigators should at least have completed a certification course for the
forensic software used and have basic training in IT forensics. Supervising investigators and court-appointed experts
should have a university degree in IT forensics (Heinson, 2015).
Investigators who are involved in cryptocurrency investigations and use available tools should have demonstrated
knowledge (e.g. certified training) on the basic architecture of cryptocurrencies, which includes the P2P communication
layer as well as the blockchain that holds the transaction ledger. Specialized trainings should also cover the functionality
of clustering heuristics, possible effects of adding an attribution tag to a certain address, and an understanding of
attached provenance information in order to correctly assess and present (US National Research Council, 2009, p. 47)
their authenticity and reliability.
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4.5. Verifiability
Themethod of collecting data and gaining informationmust be repeatable and reproducible (Maras, 2015; Heinson,
2015; Casey, 2011). This ensures that involved lawyers can follow up the acquisition of information in subsequent legal
proceedings (Heinson, 2015). With regard to limitations to disclosure and right to inspect the records (see 4.7), veri-
fiability becomes even more important and must be ensured for the individual case. If, due to technical circumstances,
repeatability or reproducibility cannot be achieved, the evidential value of the results obtained decreases considerably.
Following the recommendations of the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), repeatability
means “precision under repeatability conditions”. Repeatability conditions are “conditions where independent test
results are obtained with the same method on identical test items in the same laboratory by the same operator using
the same equipment within short intervals of time.” Reproducibility describes “precision under reproducibility condi-
tions”, which are defined as “conditions where test results are obtained with the same method on identical test items in
different laboratories with different operators using different equipment” (NIST, 2001; Maras, 2015). To account for
individual errors of the investigators, the formal review of a process can be accompanied by peer-review with different
tools (Casey, 2011, p.74).
Verifiability of cryptocurrency analysis results obtained from forensic tools can be achieved by applying the same
method that already provides authenticity and integrity of data: if identifiers of cryptocurrency clusters are computed
over a given blockchain state (identified by block hash) by applying a specified hash function over the sorted set of
addresses contained in a cluster, then the method becomes repeatable and reproducible when being applied on the same
state of the underlying blockchain.
4.6. Chain of Evidence
In order to be used in rule of law criminal proceedings, the linking of circumstantial evidence and the conclusions
drawn from it must be logical, consistent and compelling (Heinson, 2015, p. 136 et sqq.). Therefore, convictions and
the establishment of a suspicion presuppose that the facts on which they are based have a certain quality, and that it can
be concluded with a certain probability from the facts that the suspect/accused is indeed the offender (Schulz 2001,
p.593 et sqq.; Rich 2016, p. 887) . The degree of suspicion required for investigative measures and the standard of the
court’s persuasion for a conviction vary widely between the different national criminal procedural systems. However,
they have in common that the various stages of suspicion are described with normative terms. The descriptions of
the suspicion reflect a certain required quality of the facts and a required level of probability of a committed offense
that can be derived from the facts (Schulz, 2001, p. 593 et sqq.). Examples (US, UK, GER) include the “simple” -
in German law sometimes also referred to as “reasonable” (Stehle, 2016) - suspicion to start an investigation (GER-
CCP, § 152 (2)), the “reasonable suspicion” for special investigation measures (UK PACE Code A; Terry v. Ohio,
1968; GER-CCP, § 100a), “probable cause”/“urgent suspicion” for arrests and warrants (US Constitution, 4th Amdt.),
(Illinois v. Gates, 1983; Stehle, 2016), and, last but not least, the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard to convict
the suspect (Victor v. Nebraska, 1993; Miles v. US, 1880; Woolmington v. DPP, 1935; BGH NJW 1990, 1549),
(GER-CCP, § 261), (Casey, 2011, p. 55). The necessary quality of the facts and the necessary probability of someone
having committed the offense increases with the intensity of the investigation measures applied on the basis of the
suspicion (e.g. search and seizure) (Schulz, 2001, p. 567 et sqq.). For a conviction, the factual basis must be of the
highest quality and the probability of the accused being the perpetrator must be sufficiently high to convince the court
beyond reasonable doubt. (Miles v. US, 1880).
It is difficult to harmonize the normative standard of evidence in criminal proceedings with statistical results of
data analysis procedures (Rich, 2016; Meinicke, 2015). The criminal lawyers involved in the proceedings must be
enabled to subsume the results of technical investigations under the normative concepts (Rich, 2016; Meinicke, 2015).
Therefore, the relevant information must be presented to the criminal lawyers in a form and language that they can
understand (Heinson 2015, p. 130; Mohay et al. 2003, p. 132, 133; Casey 2011, p. 78) When using data analysis
techniques such as address clustering, both the software tools used and the investigating IT experts must therefore be
able to provide exact information about which evidence is to be derived from the analysis and what conclusions can be
drawn from it with what probability. In addition, possible sources of error must be identified (Rich, 2016), alternative
hypotheses must be presented and, if necessary, comprehensibly excluded. This requires a thorough understanding of
the data analysis method used (Rich, 2016) (see 4.4).
Finally, it is very important that the sources of information and data are reliable and traceable, when using address
clustering and annotation tagging (see 4.3). If information that is not absolutely certain is used in the analysis, this
circumstance and the resulting consequences for the result of the analysis and the suspicion or proof of the crime must
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be communicated to the criminal lawyers involved. A proposal for a linguistic categorization of the reliability of digital
evidence can be found at (Casey, 2011, p. 69 et sqq.).
4.7. Right to Inspect the Records/Disclosure of Evidence
The right of the accused or her defence counsel to inspect the evidence gathered by the police and the public
prosecutor’s office is a key element of constitutional criminal proceedings Wessing (2018). In inquisitorial criminal
procedure systems such as the German criminal procedure, this right is designed as the right to inspect records (GER-
CCP, § 147). Similarly, contradictory criminal procedure systems, such as the US-American one, constitute the right to
disclosure of case-relevant evidence by the public prosecutor’s office (e.g. UK: (UK-CCP, Section 3), (UK Guidelines
on Disclosure; UK Disclosure Manual), US: (US-FRE, Rule 705), (US-CCP, Rule 16), (Brady v. Mary, 1963; US v.
Bagley, 1985), (Brown, 2017, p.148). Additionally, similar rights can also arise from data protection law (e.g. EU-
LED, Recital 38, c.f. 4.1). When applying data analysis methods in either system, the question arises what information
about the software tools used and the data and information processed must be disclosed to the defendant and his
defenders. When answering this question, different interests have to be weighed. The defendant has a legitimate interest
in ensuring that the method of gathering the evidence presented against her is made transparent in order to verify that
the requirements laid down in Sections 4.1 to 4.6 are met (Wessing, 2018; Chessman, 2017; Singelnstein, 2018). One
approach could be the disclosure of source code of the used software (Chessman, 2017; Meinicke, 2015). Having
said that, law enforcement agencies have an interest in ensuring that the precise functioning of data analysis tools
does not become widely known in criminal communities, which could make their use more problematic or impossible.
(Wilson 2011, p.127; Short 2010) (US v. Johnson, 2015). Additionally, the proprietary rights of the companies that
produce and distribute the software tools used must be taken into account (Casey, 2011; Edwards and Veale, 2017;
Chessman, 2017) (Minnesota v. Underdahl, 2008; NY v. Cialino, 2007; Wisconsin v. Loomis, 2016) Moreover, the
validation of the source code alone does not account for individual errors of the investigator (Casey, 2011, p. 74).
The highly complex question of balancing arises in both systems and cannot yet be conclusively answered. What is
certain, however, is that the right to inspect the records/disclosure of evidence must be given high priority because
of its enormous importance for constitutional criminal proceedings (Chessman, 2017). A first idea could be not to
include the source code of the software, but a function and usage description (e.g. with regard to different description
approaches (Wessing, 2018; Wachter, Mittelstadt and Russel, 2018).
With regard to address clustering, the right to inspect the records and disclosure of evidence mainly concerns the
heuristics, their accuracy and also the usage of the tools in the specific case (e.g. searches in the database). In any case,
the sources of the annotated information (e.g. other law enforcement agencies, private companies, publicly available
sources) and the degree of reliability of the sources must be disclosed (UK Disclosure Manual, p.87 et sqq.) (Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 1993; Sjerps and Berger, 2012).
4.8. Summary of Key Requirements
General: Address clustering and annotation tags have to comply with the requirement for a legal basis and with
data protection principles.
Automated Decisions: Decisions, such as ordering further investigative measures may only be based on the results
of automated clustering of cryptocurrency addresses if the final decision is made by a human investigator and is not
merely formalistic.
Authenticity and Integrity: To ensure authenticity and integrity of the used address data, it is sufficient to record
the currency code (e.g BTC, ETH) and the most recent block hash as identifiers within the chain of custody. Regarding
clustering techniques, it is necessary to implement cluster identifiers that remain stable when a cluster refers to the same
set of addresses over several runs and change when the underlying set of addresses changes. This can be achieved by
computing a "cluster hash". The authenticity of attribution tags should be assured by relating a tag to its source, its
creator and generation procedures and computing a digital signature over the tag and all contextual information. This
also increases the reliability of the tags.
Reliability: In order to achieve the highest possible level of reliability, the following measures should be taken:
• Testing the formalized heuristic against some collected and verified ground truth, ideally against a general,
authoritative standard ground-truth data set (e.g. (shared) sets of addresses from known (seized) cryptocurrency
wallets).
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• Testing the reliability of the clustering algorithm within the scope of particular cryptocurrencies by using stan-
dard functional testing procedures and testing the function implementing the clustering heuristic by feeding them
a set of example transactions in a black-box test.
• Logging intensively the use of the software by investigators. When sharing analysis results: Sharing also any
information that is necessary to assess the reliability of the information at all times.
Qualification: There are no international standards for the required qualification of IT-forensic investigators. The
investigators involved in using address clustering and annotation tagging should at least have completed a certified
training on the basic architecture of cryptocurrencies, on the functionality of clustering heuristics, and on the possible
effects of adding an attribution tag to a certain address and have developed a understanding of the attached provenance
information.
Verifiability: Repeatability and Reproducibility of address clustering and annotation tagging can be achieved by
the same measures that guarantee the authenticity and integrity of data. If the source of the tags is online data, it must
be stored locally and permanently to guarantee the availability of the source.
Chain of Evidence: When using the results of address clustering techniques and annotation tagging in criminal
proceedings, the criminal lawyers involved must be enabled to subsume the results of the technical investigations under
the normative concepts of the respective criminal procedure code. Both the software tools used and the investigating
IT experts have to provide exact information about which evidence is to be derived from the analysis and what con-
clusions can be drawn from it with what probability. The information must be presented in a language and form that
is comprehensible to lawyers.
Right to Inspect the Records/Disclosure of Evidence: It is necessary to disclose a function and usage description
of the used techniques as exact as possible. This means to disclose at least the heuristics used, the degree of probability
of the results and the usage of the software tools in the specific case. Also, the sources, the process of generation of
annotated information and the degree of reliability of both, the sources and the generation process must be disclosed.
5. Data Sharing Framework
After having analyzed the technical and legal factors influencing the evidential value of cryptocurrency analytics
techniques, we now proceed and propose a framework for data sharing and provenance tracking that, on the one hand,
considers the efficiency and effectiveness needs of law enforcement agencies and, on the other hand, provides court-
proof evidential value to forensic investigations and adheres to legal key requirements in the context of law enforcement.
In the following, we focus on sharing of attribution tags among law enforcement agencies, in a way that can, according
to our analysis, be accepted as truthful by court.
Previously, we already emphasized the key role of clustering heuristics and attribution tags in cryptocurrency
investigations: a single tag can deanonymize a cryptocurrency address and, when being combined with clustering
techniques, also an entire address cluster that possibly represents some real-world actor or cryptocurrency services
like exchanges or wallet providers. Therefore, sharing attribution tags and cluster information among law enforcement
agencies would certainly improve the effectiveness of forensic cryptocurrency investigations.
The challenge in attribution tag sharing lies in finding the right trade-off between law enforcement needs, existing
legal and ethical standards, as well as technical effort and practical feasibility. In the following, in Section 5.1, we
first propose a lightweight data model for sharing attribution tags that should effectively balance those opposing goals.
Then, in Section 5.4, we suggest a model for sharing address clusters.
5.1. Attribution Tag Sharing
Our proposed attribution tag sharingmodel builds on theCyber-investigation Analysis Standard Expression (CASE)4
specification in order to maximize interoperability between tools and organization. Applying that model is somehow
natural fit, since CASE is increasingly adopted as a standard for cyber-investigations and cryptocurrency forensics
has become a standard digital forensics method. It also turned out that CASE already provides most of the semantic
constructs for describing attribution tags.
Attribution tag collection and sharing can be considered as being a cyber-investigation and represented using a
CASE Investigation object. More specifically, tag collection forms the beginning of a chain of custody and thereby
4https://caseontology.org/ontology/start.html
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an InvestigativeAction. Attribution tag collection can either be performed manually or by utilizing some associ-
ated Tool, such as a crawler. This can be expressed by utilizing the CASE ActionReference class. For representing
an attribution tag, which is a specific type of Trace, we propose to extend CASE by a specific property bundle (Tag)
that provides descriptive elements for attribution tags. Thus, already defined CASE concepts can easily be refined for
attribution tag sharing as follows:
InvestigativeAction: each tag is the result of some InvestigativeAction that started and ended at some point in
time and is carried out using some instrument (e.g., Web Browser) by some real-world actor. Technical details
of the used instrument can be specified and named (e.g., Web browser) in an associated property bundle.
Investigator: represents a person who is responsible for an activity which is, in this case, creation or modification of
tags. An agent carries a human-readable name (e.g. “John Doe”).
Tag: is a specific form of Trace and represents an attribution tag that attributes contextual information to some
cryptocurrency address. A tag can refer to some digital, physical, or purely conceptual thing and carries a
unique identifier (e.g. http://exampletool.com/tag/1) in order to bind its meaning to a certain application
context and to avoid naming collisions across contexts. A tag usually carries a human readable label (e.g.
“Internet Archive”) and can be categorized (category) along several dimensions (see below).
Second, the data model also considers the key legal requirements summarized in Section 4.8 by translating them
into corresponding data model fields:
Hash: is a fingerprint of the tag description and provides integrity. It can be computed over the sorted set of attribute
value pairs following an agreed-upon, standard hash function (what?).
Signature: an optional attribute to present the authenticity of an Agent (who?). It can either follow an agreed upon
signature scheme or an signature abstraction such as described in RFC5126 Pinkas (2008).
Timestamps: automated and trusted time stamping (e.g. based on RFC3161 Adams (2001) or extensions) routines
should record when an InvestigativeAction was performed. CASE createTime and endTime can be used
for that purpose.
Source: each tag has been extracted from some digital or non-digital source. Each source carries a human-readable la-
bel (e.g. “Internet ArchiveWebsite”) and possible someURI referring to that source (e.g. https://archive.org).
To preserve the availability of the referenced document even if the original provider is not available anymore the
WARC File Format (ISO 28500; ISO (2017)) could be used.
In order to avoid naming collisions, all concepts and relations, as well as their instances should carry qualified
names. This can be achieved by assigning namespaces expressed as Internationalized Resource Identifiers (IRI). All
previously introduced concepts, attributes and relations could, for instance, carry the namespace (http://
case.example.org/core#), which, for convenience reasons, can be mapped to a prefix such as case. Specific
examples are http://case.example.org/core# and case:Tag5, which both refer to the same concept definition
expressed above. Figure 4 shows the conceptual entities and relations of the proposed attribution tag data sharing
model. Listing 1 shows an example attribution tag expressed in JSON-LD (Sporny, Kellogg and Lanthaler, 2014) a
JSON based linked data format specified by W3C.
5CASE does not yet define a concept Tag. However, this could be introduced in future releases.
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{
"@context": {
"@vocab": "http://case.example.org/core#",
"category": "http:// example.com/category #"
},
"@graph": [
{
"@id": "tag -collection -uuid",
"@type": "InvestigativeAction",
"name": "Attribution tag collection",
"createdBy": {"@id": "investigator1 -uuid"},
"createdTime": "2018 -10 -11 T12:23:56",
"endTime": "2018 -10 -11 T13:23:56",
"propertyBundle": [
{
"@type": "ActionReferences",
"instrument": "Web Browser",
"category": "category:ManualEntry",
"result": [
"http:// exampletool.com/tag/1"
]
}
]
},
{
"@id": "investigator1 -uuid",
"@type": "Investigator",
"name": "John Doe"
},
{
"@id": "http:// exampletool.com/tag/1",
"@type": "Trace",
"createdBy": "investigator1 -uuid",
"propertyBundle":
{
"@type": "Tag",
"label": "Internet Archive",
"address": "1 Archive1n2C579dMsAu3iC6tWzuQJz8dN",
"category": {
"@id": "category:Organization"}
},
"source":
{
"@type": "Website",
"name": "Internet Archive Donation Website",
"uri": "https:// archive.org/donate/cryptocurrency /"
},
"hash":
{
"@type":"Hash",
"hashMethod": "md5",
"hashValue": "598 d4c200461b81522a3328565c25f7c"
},
"signature":
{
"@type":"Signature",
"signatureAlgorithm": "rsa4096",
"value": "304502206 e21798a42fae0e854"
}
}
]
}
Listing 1: JSON-LD Serialization of Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Attribution Tag Sharing Model: a data model expressing main conceptual entities for describing attribution
tags.
5.2. Categorization Schemes
Assigning uniquely identifiable categories to the main conceptual entities of the tag sharing model is key for au-
tomated data processing and algorithmic decision making. Some cryptocurrency analytics tools might, for instance,
reject attribution tags that were automatically crawled from some (darknet) websites. Since making such decisions
automatically based on manually entered descriptions is often error-prone (e.g. “Web Crawl” vs. “webcrawl”), data
models should draw categories from pre-defined, agreed-upon vocabularies, which could be shared among stakehold-
ers within a specific domain or application context. Such vocabularies should define categorization terms for each type
of entity in the data sharing model (Tag, Agent, Activity, Source).
The definition of a full categorization schemes encompassing all relevant use cases is out of scope of this paper,
but could be subject to a larger standardization effort. However, as a starting point, we suggest to consider at least the
following categories for above entities:
Tag Categories: besides carrying a human-readable name (e.g. “Internet Archive”) it could also be categorized by
the type of real-world actor it represents. A real-world actor could be an Organization, an Individual, or
an entity providing some service function in a cryptocurrency ecosystem. For example a service might be: an
Exchange, a Wallet Provider, a Miner, a Marketplace, etc.
Agent Categories: distinguishing between Person and Organization is a common refinement (c.f. FOAF vocabu-
lary) for an Agent concept. Another possible use of categorization schemes could be the definition of reliability
attributes (low, medium, high), which can be assigned to agents.
Source Categories: should denote the type of source tags were extracted from. A tag could be extracted from a
Website, a Data Dump, a Device, a Tor Hidden Service, etc.
Action Categories: provide information on the type of action a tag was generated by. Common action types are
ManualEntry, Crawl, etc. Action categories could be extended to provide additional details about the activity
itself such as the tool and version used to create this tag. This enables better reproducibility.
5.3. Implementation Considerations
Vocabularies and categorization schemes could be published on the Web by making sure that all terms (e.g.
http://case.example.org/core#label) and concepts (e.g. http://example.com/category#ManualEntry)
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Figure 5: Cluster Sharing Model: a data model expressing main conceptual entities for describing and sharing address
clusters.
carry dereferencable IRIs. This allows searching and browsing available terms and categories online and to automat-
ically verify attribution tag categories before exchanging them with others. Furthermore, it also provides a definition
and documentation of terminology used in forensic investigations. A simple, straightforward way is to follow the
implementation of schema.org, which is a generic schema for structured data on the Internet.
Previously we suggested that hashes and digital signatures can provide authenticity and integrity of attribution tags.
However, for a data exchange purpose, this would require a precise and agreed-upon definition of the hash computation
and digital signature procedures. Alternatively, one could use existing GIT infrastructures for storing and publishing
attribution tags. GIT has its origin in distributed software development and is now the de-facto standard for publishing
and tracking changes in source code files. It automatically creates hashes over each file and allows users to digitally
sign their contents after each commit. GIT is increasingly used for sharing smaller and even large datasets (GIT LFS).
Therefore, we believe that it could also be used for sharing JSON-LD serializations of attribution tags. Although GIT
has good support for change tracking, GIT has shortcomings when it comes to specifying fine grained access control
policies. If tags are very sensitive and specific tags should not be shared with every participant other approaches need
to be considered. Centralized services such as Europol’s SIENA provide a data sharing solution with law enforcement
ready data access controls.
5.4. Address Cluster Sharing
Our proposed model for sharing address clusters, which is shown in Figure 5, builds on the previously introduced
attribution tag sharing model and introduces the following conceptual entities, attributes, and relationships:
Action: describes the process that produced a cluster. When clusters were created algorithmically the underlying
procedure or heuristics must be named and, in the ideal case, be drawn from some controlled vocabulary that
provides an exact definition of that procedure.
Cluster: a cluster is a specific type of Trace and represents a set of cryptocurrency addresses and is a key entity to be
exchanged within cryptocurrency investigations. A cluster can carry a number of tags, which can be referenced
by their unique (possibly dereferencable) IRIs. Authenticity can be shown by digitally signing the cluster with
all its contextually relevant attributes.
Investigator: denotes the persons who controls the clustering method. Typically, clusters are created by forensic tools
that implement certain heuristics or by manually identifying a set of addresses belonging to the same real-world
actor.
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Just as in attribution tag sharing model, all vocabulary terms and used categories should carry qualified names,
which could be implemented as dereferencable IRIs. Listing 2 shows a JSON-LD serialization of the above cluster
model example.
{
"@context": {
"@vocab": "http://case.example.org/core#",
"category": "http:// example.com/category #"
},
"@graph": [
{
"@id": "clustering -process -uuid",
"@type": "Action",
"name": "Address Clustering",
"createdBy": {"@id": "investigator1 -uuid"},
"createdTime": "2018 -10 -11 T16:23:56",
"endTime": "2018 -10 -11 T17:34:23",
"propertyBundle": [
{
"@type": "ActionReferences",
"instrument": "GraphSense Cryptocurrency Analytics Platform",
"category": "category:MultipleInputClustering",
"currency": "BTC",
"blockhash": "0000000000000 d58cd618",
"result": [
{"@id": "http:// exampletool.com/cluster /1"},
{"@id": "http:// exampletool.com/cluster /2"}
]
}
]
},
{
"@id": "http:// exampletool.com/cluster /1",
"@type": "Trace",
"createdBy": {"@id": "investigator1 -uuid"},
"propertyBundle":
{
"@type": "Cluster",
"addresses": [
"1 Archive1n2C579dMsAu3iC6tWzuQJz8dN",
"1 KeDrQdATuXaZFW4CL9tfe2zpQ5SrmBFWc",
"1 Lyr44vPADgVFqqMCvykx5KxG15PKVYjW3"
],
"tags": [
{"@id":"http:// exampletool.com/tag/1"},
{"@id":"http:// exampletool.com/tag/2"}
]
},
"hash":
{
"@type":"Hash",
"hashMethod": "md5",
"hashValue": "43887665 f4c94641c357c111aa12acb1"
},
"signature":
{
"@type":"Signature",
"signatureAlgorithm": "rsa4096",
"value": "73095072206 e21798a42fae0e854"
}
}
]
}
Listing 2: JSON-LD Serialization of Figure 5.
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6. Discussion
We systematically analyzed the possibilities and shortcomings of known cryptocurrency forensics techniques from
a combined legal and technical perspective. Our empirical analysis illustrated the effects of CoinJoin transactions on
the accuracy of the results of multi-input address clustering. It has shown that the result of naïve multi-input address
clustering is significantly influenced by CoinJoin transactions. Whenever multi-input address clustering is used for
criminal investigations, CoinJoins need to be considered either by proactively excluding them from clustering or at least
by highlighting those clusters that are influenced by CoinJoins to indicate the potential inaccuracy to law enforcement
personnel. Our analysis clearly showed the need for reliable ground truth data that is hard to obtain by observing the
underlying blockchain alone. In a law enforcement setting, this could be achieved by sharing seized wallets or at least
the addresses belonging to a wallet to build a comprehensive ground truth dataset, possibly via a central database.
Furthermore, the effectiveness of clustering heuristics often relies on assumptions about user behavior. User behavior
can obviously change and thus potentially invalidate the underlying assumptions, therefore constant monitoring and
reevaluation is needed.
Our legal analysis has shown that so far there are no internationally binding standards for measuring, securing, or
increasing the evidential value of the results of address clustering and annotation tagging. However, by synthesizing
different criminal procedural codes and data protection regulations, minimum standards can be obtained which can
claim a certain validity in any constitutional criminal procedure. Address clustering and annotation tagging have to
comply with the requirement of having a legal basis and with data protection principles. To ensure a high evidential
value, Address clustering and annotation tagging have to meet the requirements of the chain of custody (authenticity
and integrity) and reliability. Investigators using these techniquesmust be sufficiently qualified to do so (e.g. by certified
courses). The results of address clustering and annotation tagging must be repeatable and reproducible (if possible).
Moreover, the criminal lawyers involved must be enabled to subsume the results under the normative concepts of the
applicable criminal procedure code by presenting the results in an language and form that is comprehensible for lawyers.
To meet the requirement to inspect the records/the principle of disclosure of evidence it is necessary to disclose a exact
function and usage description of the used heuristics, the used software tools and the source and generation process of
annotated information. Finally, decisions on further investigative measures (e.g. a property search) and a conviction
may only be based on automated findings if the final decision is made by a person and her decision is not merely
formalistic.
We have used the insights into technical challenges and the legal requirements of cryptocurrency investigations to
develop a data sharing model that helps to strengthen the evidential value of the gathered evidence. It has been shown
that it is possible to meet (most) legal requirements for securing the evidential value and complying with the principles
of data protection through easy-to-implement and practically applicable measures. Furthermore, we laid a stepping
stone for future data sharing and standardization efforts in the field of cryptocurrency investigations.
A clear technical limitation of this paper is that we only investigated the multi-input clustering heuristic and the
Bitcoin system. Moreover, we did not take every existing or imaginable mixing technique into account. Nevertheless,
many of the findings can be transferred to other cryptocurrency systems, heuristics and mixing techniques or at least
serve as a basis for further research in those areas. In the legal part, we tried to cover a broad spectrum of legal
systems by using both sources from the Anglo-American legal systems (Common Law) and those from the continental
legal systems (mostly Civil Law). Of course, the findings of the legal analysis still need to be adapted for practical
application in particular countries for the criminal procedure codes applicable there. However, our model can serve as
a blueprint for doing so since it establishes minimum standards for constitutional criminal procedures.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we discussed clustering heuristics and attribution tags, which are the two key techniques implemented
in forensic tools used in cryptocurrency investigations. By empirically quantifying the effect of CoinJoin transactions
we illustrated that clustering heuristics can lead to false interpretations. We discussed those techniques in the light of
internationally accepted legal standards and rules for substantiating suspicions and providing evidence in court. From
that, we derived a set of legal key requirements and translated them into a data sharing framework that builds on existing
legal and technical standards. We propose the implementation of this framework in tools used for cryptocurrency
investigations to safeguard the value of produced evidence.
Future research on the technical side should focus on additional metrics that can help in quantifying the reliability
of clustering results. On the legal side, the possibilities and limitations of merging the results of (automated) address
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clustering techniques with the normative concept of “suspicion” as well as the necessary persuasion of the court for a
conviction need to be further examined. It is also worthwhile to consider possibilities for standardizing attribution tags
and cluster sharing in the field of international law enforcement. Finally, our paper can be an anchor point for future
research on other heuristics, mixing techniques, and the applicability of address clustering and annotation tagging in
other cryptocurrency systems to foster the evidential value of cryptocurrency analyses.
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